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Abstract
Individuals can insure themselves perfectly against uncertainty about the
length of life by purchasing deferred annuities early in life. In the absence of
other uninsurable uncertainties (e.g. income), there will be no residual pur-
chases or sales of annuities later in life, thereby avoiding any adverse-selection.
In contrast, the presence of such uncertainties creates an active residual an-
nuity market based on the arrival of new information. We characterize the
equilibrium in the residual annuity market and propose a new nancial in-
strument, refundable annuities with a guaranteed refund price, which enables
individuals who hold a portfolio of such annuities to better adjust their op-
timum consumption plan to di¤erent realizations. Refundable annuities are
shown to be equivalent to annuity options, that is, options that, if exercised,
enable the purchase of annuities later in life at a predetermined price. Holding
a variety of refundable annuities is (ex-ante) welfare enhancing.
JEL Classication: D82, G14, G22.
Key Words: Annuities, Longevity, Asymmetric Information, Pooling Equilib-
rium, Refundable Annuities, Options.
* Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, ISRAEL. E-mail:
mseytan@mscc.huji.ac.il. This paper is based on a presentation made at the CESifo Summer
Institute Workshop on "Longevity and Annuitization" which was held in Venice, July 16 -
17, 2007. See also Sheshinski (2007).
1 The Timing of Annuity Purchases
In the presence of a competitive annuity market, individuals can perfectly
insure themselves against uncertainty with respect to the length of life by
investing all their savings in deferred, long-term annuities. The implication
of associating annuity purchases with savings is that the bulk of annuities are
purchased throughout ones working phase. This stands in stark contrast to
empirical evidence that most private annuities are purchased at ages close to
retirement (in the US the average age of annuity purchasers is 62).
A recent survey in the UK (Gardner and Wadsworth (2004)) reports that
half of the individuals in the sample would, given the option, never annuitize.
This attitude is independent of specic annuity terms and prices. By far, the
dominant reason given for the reluctance to annuitize was a "preference for
exibility". Among those willing to annuitize, the major factors that a¤ected
their decision were health (those in good health more likely to annuitize), edu-
cation, household size (less likely to annuitize as household size increases) and
income (willing to channel higher earnings to annuities).
Lack of exibility in holding annuities was interpreted by the respondents
as inability to short-sell (or borrow against) early purchased annuities when
personal circumstances make such sale desirable. Preference to sell annuities
arises typically upon the realization of negative information about longevity
(disability) or income. In this survey, the reluctance to purchase annuities
early in life was hardly a¤ected by knowledge that annuities purchased later
will be more expensive (due to adverse-selection).
Data about the timing of annuity purchases and surveys such as the above
suggest a need to develop a model that incorporates uninsurable risks, such
as income (or needs such as long-term care) in addition to longevity risk.
Further, to respond to individualsdesire for exibility, the model should allow
for short-sales of annuities purchased early or the purchase of additional short-
term annuities when so desired. We build the analysis on a model developed
by Brugiavini (1993) with this objective in mind.
With uncertainty extending to other variables beyond longevity, compet-
itive annuity markets cannot attain a First-Best allocation (which requires in-
come transfers across states of nature). Sequential annuity market equilibrium
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is characterized by the purchase of long-term annuities early in life, short-sale
of some of these annuities or the purchase of additional short-term annuities
later-on, upon the arrival of information relevant for decisions on optimum
consumption.
Since the competitive equilibrium is Second-Best, it is natural to ask
whether there are nancial instruments which, if available, are (ex-ante) wel-
fare improving. We answer this question in the a¢ rmative, proposing a new
type of refundable annuities. These are annuities that can be refunded at a
later date, if so desired, at a pre-determined price. Holding a portfolio of such
refundable annuities with varying refund prices allows individuals more exibil-
ity in adjusting their consumption path upon the arrival of information about
longevity and other relevant factors such as income.
It is shown below that refundable annuities are equivalent to annuity op-
tions. These are options that entitle the holder to purchase annuities at a later
date at a pre-determined price.
Interestingly, annuity options are available in the UK. It is worth quoting
from a textbook for actuaries (Fisher and Young (1965)):
"Guaranteed Annuity Options. The option may not be exercised
until a future date ranging perhaps from 5 to 50 years hence...
The mortality and interest assumptions should be conservative...
The estimates of future improvement implied by experience from
which mortality tables were constructed suggest that there should
be di¤erences in rates according to the year in which the option
is exercisable... A di¤erence of about 1
4
% in the yield per $100
purchase price could arise between one option and another exer-
cisable ten years later... (Such) di¤erences in guaranteed annuity
rates according to the future date on which they are exercisable do
therefore seem to be justied in theory" (Actuarial Practice of Life
Assurance, p. 421).
The new behavioral economics literature seems to provide additional sup-
port to the o¤ering of annuity options which involve a small present cost and
allow postponement of decisions to purchase annuities. It has been argued (e.g.
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) and Laibson (1997)) that these features provide a
positive inducement to purchase annuities for individuals with tendencies to
procrastinate or heavily discount the short-run future.
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2 Annuity Market Equilibrium Under
Survival Uncertainty
Individuals live for two or three periods. Their longevity is unknown in period
zero. They learn their period two survival probability, p (0  p  1) at the
beginning of period one. Survival probabilities have a continuous distribution
function, F (p); with support [p; p]: In period zero, all individuals earn the
same income, y0, and do not consume. They purchase (long-term) annuities,
each of which pays $1 in period two if the holder of the annuity is alive (all
individuals survive to period one). Denote the amount of these annuities by
a0 and their price by q0. Individuals can also save in non-annuitized assets
who, for simplicity, are assumed to carry a zero rate of interest. The amount
of savings in period zero is y0   q0a0.
At the beginning of period one (working years), individuals earn an in-
come, y1, learn about their survival probability, p, 1  p  0; and make
decisions about their consumption in period one, c1, and in period two, c2 (if
alive). They may purchase additional one-period (short-term) annuities, a1,
a1  0; or short-sell an amount b1 of period-zero annuities, b1  0: Of course,
as we shall see, if they purchase additional annuities then no annuities are sold
(a1 > 0 implies b1 = 0) and vice-versa (b1 > 0 implies a1 = 0). Assuming
that some consumption is invaluable, individuals never sell all their long-term
annuities, that is, a0   b1 > 0: In period two, annuitiespayout is a0 + a1   b1
if the holder of the annuities is alive and zero if the holder is dead.
(a) First-Best
Suppose that income in period one, y1, is known with certainty so individuals
are distinguished only by their realized survival probabilities in period one.
Expected lifetime utility, V; is
V = E [u(c1) + pu(c2)] (1)
where u0(c) > 0; u00(c) < 0 and u0(0) =1:
The economys resource constraint is
E [c1 + pc2] = y0 + y1 (2)
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Optimum consumption, the solution to maximization of (1) s.t. (2), is
denoted (c1(p); c

2(p)). Concavity of V and the linear constraint make this
First-Best allocation independent of p: c1(p) = c

2(p) = c
; where
c =
y0 + y1
1 + E(p)
(3)
where
E(p) =
pZ
p
pdF (p) (4)
is expected lifetime. We shall now show that a competitive long-term annuity
market attains the First-Best allocation.
(b) Annuity Market Equilibrium: No Late Transactions
In period one, the issuers of annuities can distinguish between those who pur-
chase additional annuities (lenders) and those who short-sell period zero annu-
ities (borrowers). Since borrowing and lending activities are distinguishable,
their prices may be di¤erent. Denote the lending price by q11 and the borrowing
price by q21:
The individuals maximization is solved backwards: Given a0; p; q11 and
q21; individuals in period one maximize utility
Max
a10; b10
[u(c1) + pu(c2)] (5)
where
c1 = y0 + y1   q0a0   q11a1 + q21b1
c2 = a0 + a1   b1 (6)
The F.O.C. are
 u0(c1)q11 + pu0(c2)  0 (7)
and
u0(c1)q21   pu0(c2)  0 (8)
Denote the solutions to (6) - (8) by a^1(p); b^1(p); c^1(p) and c^2(p); where we
suppress the dependence on q0; q11; q
2
1; y0 and y1: It can be shown (see Appendix)
that when a^1(p) > 0; so (7) holds with equality,
@a^1
@p
> 0 and when b^1(p) > 0;
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so (8) holds with equality,
@b^1
@p
< 0. A higher survival probability increases the
amount of lending and decreases the amount of borrowing whenever these are
positive.
Optimum consumption is strictly positive, c^i(p) > 0; i = 1; 2; for all
p  p  p (this is ensured by the condition that u0(0) =1).
At this point, assume that q21 < q
1
1: This condition ensures, by (7) - (8),
that individuals are either lenders (a^1 > 0) or borrowers (b^1 > 0) and not both.
It is shown below that this condition always holds in equilibrium.
In period zero, individuals choose an amount a0 that maximizes expected
utility, anticipating optimum behavior in period one:
Max
a00
E [u(c^1) + pu(c^2)] (9)
s.t. (6). By the envelope theorem, the F.O.C. is
 E [u0(c^1)]q0 + E [pu0(c^2)] = 0 (10)
Denote the optimum amount of period zero annuities by a^0: Since in period
zero all individuals are alike and purchase the same amount of annuities, the
equilibrium price, q^0; is equal to expected lifetime, (4),
q^0 = E(p) (11)
The equilibrium prices of a1 and of b1; denoted q^11 and q^
2
1; respectively, are
determined as follows.
When (7) holds with equality at the kink, a^1 = b^1 = 0; this determines
a survival probability, pa; pa = q11; where
 =
u0(y0 + y1   E(p)a^0)
u0(a^0)
(12)
with a^0 determined by (10) and (11):
 E [u0(y0 + y1   E(p)a^0   q11 a^1(p) + q21 b^1(p))]E(p)+
+E [pu0(a^0 + a^1(p)  b^1(p))] = 0 (13)
When a^1(p) = b^1(p) = 0 for all p; p  p  p; then, from (13),  = 1
(because marginal utilities are independent of p). When pa < p then, by (7),
a^1(p) > 0 for p  p  pa and a^1(p) = 0 for pa  p  p:
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Using a similar argument for short-sales, dene pb = q21: The condition
q21 < q
1
1 implies that pb < pa: It can be seen from (8) that if pb > p; then b^1 > 0
for p  p < pb and b^1 = 0 for p  p  pb. Summarizing,
a^1 > 0; b^1 = 0 pa < p  p
a^1 = b^1 = 0 pb  p  pa
b^1 > 0; a^1 = 0 p  p < pb
(14)
The equilibrium prices, q^11 and q^
2
1; are determined by zero expected prots
conditions for a pooling equilibrium:
pZ
pa
(q^11   p)a^1(p)dF (p) = 0 (15)
and
pbZ
p
(q^21   p)b^1(p)dF (p) = 0 (16)
Equilibrium prices are seen to be weighted averages of survival proba-
bilities of those who purchase or sell short-term annuities, with equilibrium
quantities bought or sold serving as weights.
Note that the bounds of integration, pa and pb; depend on the equilibrium
values q^11 and q^
2
1: As shown by Brugiavini (1993), equilibrium prices that satisfy
(15) and (16) are q11 = p and q
2
1 = p; which implying that a^1 = b^1 = 0 for all
p. Under a certain condition, this solution is unique. Proof is provided in the
Appendix. This solution entails that c^1(p) and c^2(p) are independent of p and,
by (13), equal to the First-Best allocation: c^i(p) = c; i = 1; 2; given by (3).
Proposition 1: when uncertainty is conned to future survival probabil-
ities, consumers purchase early in life an amount of annuities that generates
zero demand for annuities in older ages, ensuring a consumption path that is
independent of the state of nature ( c^1 and c^2 independent of p). Consequently,
there will be no annuity transactions late in life.
Proof : Appendix.
This stark conclusion is in contrast to overwhelming empirical evidence
which shows that private annuities are purchased by individuals in advanced
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ages1. Indeed, we shall now show that the above conclusion does not carry-over
to more realistic cases with uncertainty about (uninsurable) other variables,
such as income, in addition to survival probabilities.
3 Sequential EquilibriumUnder Uncertain Sur-
vival and Uncertain Future Incomes
Suppose that in period zero, the probability of survival to period two and the
level of income in period one, y1; are both uncertain, their realizations occurring
at the beginning of period one2. The realized levels of p and y1 are assumed
to be private information unknown to the issuers of annuities. For simplicity,
assume that y1 is distributed independently of p. Its distribution, denoted by
G(y1); has the support (y1; y1):
(a) First-Best
As before, the First-Best allocation maximizes expected utility, (1), subject to
the resource constraint
E [c1 + pc2] = y0 + E(y1) (17)
Again, the solution is independent of p: c1 = c

2 =
y0 + E(y1)
1 + E(p)
: However,
unlike the previous case where the early purchase of annuities could fully insure
against survival uncertainty and, consequently, implement the First-Best allo-
cation, it is seen from (17) that the First-Best solution with income uncertainty
requires income transfers, providing the expected level of income to everyone.
Indeed, income insurance would enable such transfers. However, for obvious
reasons, the level of realized income must be assumed to be private information
and this precludes insurance contingent on the level of income. Consequently,
the annuity market cannot, in general, attain the First-Best allocation.
1See Brown et-al (2001).
2An alternative formulation is to make utility in period one depend on a parameter
(needs), whose value is unknown in period zero and realized at the beginning of period one.
This formulation yields the same results as below.
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(b) Sequential Annuity Market Equilibrium
As before, maximization is done backwards. In period one, utility maximiza-
tion w.r.t. a1 yields the F.O.C.
 u01(c^1)q11 + pu0(c^2)  0 (18)
with equality when a^1 > 0: Setting a^1 = b^1 = 0 and (18) with equality
 u0(y0   q0a0 + ~y11(p)) q11 + pu0(a0) = 0 (19)
(19) denes for each p a critical level of income, ~y11(p): Since  u0(y0   q0a0 +
y1 + q
2
1b1) q
1
1 + pu
0(a0   b1) > 0 for all y1 > ~y11(p) and b1  0; it follows
that a^1(p; y1) > 0 for all y1; y1  y1 > ~y11(p) and a^1(p; y1) = 0 for all y1;
y
1
 y1 < ~y11(p) (see Figure 1).
Similarly, the F.O.C. w.r.t. b1 is
u0(c^1)q21   pu0(c^2)  0 (20)
with equality when b^1 > 0:Again, setting a^1 = b^1 = 0; (20) with equality denes
for each p a critical level of income, ~y21(p): Since u
0(y0 q0a0+y1)q21 pu0(a0) > 0
for all y
1
 y1 < ~y21(p) and a^1  0; it follows that b^1(p; y1) > 0 for all y1 
y1 < ~y
2
1(p) and b^1(p; y1) = 0 for all y1  y1 > ~y21(p):
To make the pattern displayed in Figure (1) consistent, it is necessary
that ~y21(p) < ~y
1
1(p) for all p; which is equivalent to the condition that q
2
1 < q
1
1:
That is, the borrowing price is lower than the lending price3. We shall show
that this condition is always satised in equilibrium
3For a 2  2 case, Brugiavini (1993) shows that the condition is that income variability
be large relative to the variability of survival probabilities. This ensures that all individuals
with a high income and with any survival probability purchase annuities, and vice-versa.
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Figure 1
Pattern of Period One Annuity Purchases
Equilibrium prices, (q^11; q^
2
1); are dened by zero expected prots condi-
tions:
pZ
p
(q^11   p)a^1(p; ) dF (p) = 0 (21)
and
pZ
p
(q^21   p)b^1(p; ) dF (p) = 0 (22)
where a^1(p; ) =
y1R
~y11(p)
a^1(p; y1)dG(y1) and b^1(p; ) =
~y21(p)R
y
1
b^1(p; y1)dG(y1); are total
demands for a1 and b1, respectively, by all relevant income recipients with a
given p.
Recall that a^1 and b^1 depend implicitly on q11 and q
2
1 and on ~y
1
1(p) and
~y21(p); dened above. Thus, existence and uniqueness of (q^
1
1; q^
2
1); dened by
(20) and (21), requires certain conditions.
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From (21) and (22),
q^11   q^21 =
pZ
p
p'(p)dF (p) (23)
where
'(p) =
a^1(p; )
pR
p
a^1(p; ) dF (p)
  b^1(p; )
pR
p
b^1(p; ) dF (p)
(24)
Clearly,
pR
p
'(p) dF (p) = 0: Hence, '(p) changes sign at least once over
[p; p]: Since a^1(p; ) strictly increases and b^1(p; ) strictly decreases in p, '(p)
strictly increases in p. This implies that there exists a unique ~p; p < ~p < p;
such that '(p) S 0 as p S ~p: It follows that
q^11   q^21 =
pZ
p
p'(p)dF (p) > ~p
pZ
p
'(p)dF (p) = 0 (25)
Thus, the condition for an equilibrium with active lending and borrowing
in period one is satised.
As before, the equilibrium price for period zero annuities is equal to life
expectancy:
q^0 = E(p) =
pZ
p
pdF (p) (26)
Of course, 0 < q^0 < 1: Notice that, since a^1(p; ) strictly increases and
b^1(p; ) strictly decreases in p, 1 > q^11 > q^0 while q^21 < q^0; reecting adverse
selection in period one.
4 Refundable Annuities
We have seen that when uncertainty early in life is conned to longevity
then the optimum purchase of long-term annuities provides perfect protection
against this uncertainty. Consequently, all annuity transactions occur early
in life with no residual activities at later ages and hence no adverse selection
(Proposition 1). In contrast, when faced with uninsurable uncertainties in
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addition to longevity, individuals are induced to adjust their portfolios upon
the arrival of new information. These adjustments are characterized by adverse
selection, reected in a higher price for (short-term) annuities purchased and
a lower price for annuities sold. Recall that in the above discussion we have
allowed the purchase of short-term annuities late in life as well as the short
sale of long-term annuities purchased earlier. In spite of these "pro-market"
assumptions, asymmetric information generates adverse selection.
In these circumstances, we pose the following question: are there nancial
instruments which, if available, may improve the market allocation in terms of
expected utility4? We answer this question in the a¢ rmative by proposing a
new nancial instrument that may achieve this goal. The proposal is to have
a new class of annuities, each carrying a guaranteed commitment by the issuer
to refund the annuity, when presented by the holder, at a (pre) specied price.
Call these (guaranteed) refundable annuities.
As shown below, the short-sale of annuities purchased in period zero is
equivalent to the purchase in period zero of refundable annuities whose refund
price is equal to q^21: Therefore, in order to improve upon this allocation, it
is proposed that individuals will hold a portfolio composed of a variety of
refundable annuities with di¤erent refund prices. The purchase of refundable
annuities with di¤erent refund prices will provide more exibility in adjusting
consumption to the arrival of information about longevity and income. With
regular annuities, the revenue per annuity from short-sales in period one is
independent of the quantity of annuities sold. With a variety of refundable
annuities, this revenue may vary: depending on the realization of longevity and
income, individuals will sell refundable annuities in descending order, from the
highest guaranteed refund price and down.
Proposition 2: A portfolio of refundable annuities with di¤erent refund
prices will enable these adjustments to be more closely related to the realization
of the level of income and longevity, and provide more exibility to individuals
decisions about their optimum consumption path, thereby increasing expected
utility.
4We mean instruments which work via individual incentives, in contrast to scal means,
such as taxes/subsidies, available to the government.
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The proof of Proposition 2 is by construction. Formally, within the context
of the previous three period model, the market for refundable annuities works
as follows. Dene a refundable annuity of type r as an annuity purchased in
period zero with a guaranteed refund price of r  0: This includes annuities
with no refund price (r = 0). As before, individuals may borrow against
these annuities at the market price for borrowing, as described in the previous
section. Denote the amount of type r annuities by ar0; a
r
0  0; and the amount
refunded by br1; a
r
0  br1  0:
Consider rst only one type of refundable annuities. For any realization
of y1, consumption in periods one and two is:
c1 = y0 + y1   qr0ar0 + rbr1   q1a1
c2 = a
r
0   br1 + a1 (27)
where a1  0 are (short-term) annuities purchased in period one at a price of
q1 and qr0 is the price of the refundable annuity
5.
In view of (11), maximization of (1) w.r.t. br1 and a1 yields F.O.C.
u0(c1)r   pu0(c2)  0 (28)
and
 u0(c1)q1 + pu0(c2)  0 (29)
Denote the solutions to these equations by b^r1(p; y1); and a^1(p; y1): Again,
these functions implicitly depend on y0  qr0ar0; r and q1: The optimum level of
period zero annuities is determined by maximization of expected utility, (3),
assuming an optimum choice, (c^1; c^2); in period one. The F.O.C. is
 E [u0(c^1)]qr0 + E [pu0(c^2)] = 0 (30)
Denote the solution to (16) by a^r0: The equilibrium price q^
r
0 satises a zero
expected prots condition:
5In period zero we allow annuities with no refund price (r = 0) and individuals may short-
sell these annuities in period one (borrow) at a market determined price. For simplicity, we
disregard this possibility here. See Appendix.
Extension of the model beyond three periods would allow to have refundable annuities
which can be exercised at di¤erent dates.
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q^r0a^
r
0 =
pZ
p
p(a^r0   b^r1(p; )dF (p) + r
pZ
p
b^r1(p; )dF (p)
or
q^r0 = E(p) +
1
a^r0
pZ
p
(r   p)b^r1(p; )dF (p) (31)
while q^1 is determined by (8).
Two observations are in place. First, a condition for an active annuity
market in period zero is that r < q^1. This is equivalent to the requirement
above (with no refundable annuities) that q^21 < q^
1
1: When the refund price
exceeds the price of period one annuities, r > q^1, individuals will refund all the
annuities purchased in period zero, b^r1(p; y1) = a^
r
0; for all p and y1: But then,
by (15), q^r0 = r > q^1: However, when the price of annuities in period one is
lower than their price in period zero, no annuities will be purchased in period
zero, a^r0 = 0.
Second, comparing (21) and (27), it is seen that refundable annuities and
short-sales of period zero annuities (borrowing) are equivalent when the refund
and the borrowing price are equal: r = q^21: Thus, when short-sales are permit-
ted, refundable annuities may be (ex-ante) welfare enhancing if they provide a
refund price or a variety of refund prices di¤erent from the borrowing equilib-
rium price.
5 A Portfolio of Refundable Annuities
Now suppose that individuals can purchase in period zero a variety of refund-
able annuities. Type ri  0 annuities are annuities that each guarantees a
refund of ri when presented by the holder in period one. There are k types
of such refundable annuities, ranked from the highest refund down, r1 > r2:::
> rk  0: Denote the price and the amount purchased of type ri annuities by
qi0 and a
i
0; respectively. The amount refunded of type ri annuities in period
one is denoted bi1; a
i
0  bi1  0:
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Individualsconsumption is now given by
c1 = y0 + y1  
kX
i=1
qi0a
i
0   q1a1 +
kX
i=1
rib
i
1 (32)
and
c2 =
kX
i=1
(ai0   bi1) + a1 (33)
Maximization of (5) w.r.t. a1 and bi1; i = 1; 2; ::; k; yields F.O.C.
 u0(c1)q1 + pu0(c2)  0 (34)
and
u0(c1)ri   pu0(c2)  0; i = 1; 2; ::; k (35)
with equality when a1 > 0 and bi1 > 0; respectively. Denote the solutions to
(34) and (35) by a^1 and b^i1; i = 1; 2; ::; k: These are functions of r = (r1; r2; ::rk);
q0 = (q
1
0; q
2
0; ::q
k
0) and q1:
It is seen from (35) that if b^i1 > 0 then b^
i
1 = a
i
0; for all 1  i > j: That is
all the higher ranked annuities (compared to the marginally refunded annuity)
are fully refunded.
The amount of type ri annuities purchased in period zero is determined
by maximization of expected utility, (9), yielding F.O.C.
 E[u0(c1)]qi0 + E[pu0(c2)]; i = 1; 2; ::; k (36)
where the expectation is over p and y1.
The value of holding a diversied optimum portfolio of refundable annu-
ities clearly depends on specic assumptions about risk attitudes (utility func-
tion) and the joint distribution of longevity and income. To provide insight
plan to do detailed calculations and report them in a separate paper6.
6This is joint research with Jerry Green of Harvard University, who has been instrumental
in developing the ideas in this paper.
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6 Equivalence of Refundable Annuities and
Annuity Options
We shall demonstrate that refundable annuities are equivalent to options to
purchase annuities at a later date for a pre-determined price. In terms of the
above three period model, suppose that individuals can purchase in period zero
options, each of which entitles the owner to purchase in period one an annuity
at a given price. As before, the payout of each annuity is $1 in period two if
the owner is alive and nothing if dead. Denote by o() the price of an option
that, if exercised, entitles the holder to purchase in period one an annuity at a
price of : On a time scale, the scheme is as follows:
Annuity Options
The comparable scheme for refundable annuities is:
Refundable Annuities
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It is seen that when q^r0 =o() +  and r =  (and hence, o() = q^
r
0   r),
these two schemes are equivalent.
In addition to the above discussion about the advantages of the exibility
o¤ered by holding a portfolio of options to annuitize, there may be additional
behavioralreasons in favor of such options. A vast economic literature reports
experimental and empirical evidence of individualsbounded rationality and
shortsightedness (e.g.Rabin (1998) and (1999), Mitchell and Utkus (2004)).
Of particular relevance to our case seems to be the plan designed by Thaler
and Benartzi (2004), where individuals commit to save for pensions a certain
fraction from future increases in earnings. The raison-detre for this plan is,
presumably, cognitive shortcomings or self-control problems (procrastination,
short-sightedness). Individuals are more willing to commit to the purchase
of annuities from increases in earnings compared to the purchase by rational
individuals. By deliberately delaying the implementation of the purchase of
annuities, this plan may accommodate hyperbolic discounters (Laibson (1997))
who put a high discount rate on short-run saving. Thaler and Benartzi report
that their plan has been successfully implemented by a number of rms. There
seem to be parallels between the psychological insight that motivated this plan
and the proposed options to annuitize at a later date.
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Appendix
We have seen in the text that b^1(p) = 0 when a^1(p) > 0 and (7) holds
with equality. Di¤erentiating w.r.t. p
@a^1
@p
=  1
p
0BB@ 1u00(c^1)
u0(c^1)
q11 +
u00(c^2)
u0(c^2)
1CCA > 0 (A.1)
Similarly, when b^1(p) > 0 then a^1(p) = 0 and (8) holds with equality.
Di¤erentiating w.r.t. p
@b^1
@p
=
1
p
0BB@ 1u00(c^1)
u0(c^1)
q21 +
u00(c^2)
u0(c^2)
1CCA < 0 (A.2)
Consider the zero expected condition (5):
pZ
pa
(q11   p)a^1(p)dF (p) = 0 (A.3)
Where pa = q11;  is given by (12):
 =
u0(y0 + y1   E(p)a^0)
u0(a^0)
(A.4)
and a^0 is determined by (13)
 E [u0(y0 + y1   E(p)a^0   q11 a^1(p) + q21 b^1(p))E(p)+
+E [pu0(a^0 + a^1(p)  b^1(p))] = 0 (A.5)
When a^1(p) = b^1(p) = 0 for p  p  p; then  = 1 (because in (A.5),
marginal utilities are independent of p). Whenever a^1(p) > 0 and b^1(p) > 0 for
some ranges of p, this changes a^0; and hence ; compared to the previous case.
Denote by ' expected prots in the period one market for annuities,
'(q11) =
pZ
pa
(q11   p)a^1(p)dF (p) (A.6)
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An equilibrium price, q^11; is dened by '(q^
1
1) = 0: Since pa = p when q
1
1 = p
(because a^1(p) = 0; and  = 1); q^11 = p is an equilibrium price, implying no
purchase of annuities in period one. A similar argument applies to the market
for b1: here the equilibrium price is q^21 = p; implying b^1(p) = 0 for all p.
Could there be another equilibrium with pa < p (and pb > p)? Under a
mildcondition the answer is negative.
Suppose that q11 = E(p): Then, by (7) - (8) and (A.5), a^0 = 0 and b^1(p) = 0
for all p  p  p: This is reasonable: when prices of annuities in period zero
and in period one are equal, annuities are purchased only in period one. Then,
by (A.4),  = 0: It now follows from (A.1) and (A.6) that '(E(p)) < 0: A
su¢ cient condition that q^11 = p be the only equilibrium price is that '(q
1
1)
strictly increases for all q11; E(p) < q
1
1 < p: From (A.6), the condition is
'0(q11) =
pZ
pa
[a^1(p) + (q^
1
1   p)
da^1(p)
dq11
] dF (p) > 0 (A.7)
Note that
da^1(p)
dq11
in (A.7) is the total derivative of a^1(p) w.r.t. q11; taking
into account the equilibrium change in a^0 (from (A.5)). Condition (A.7) ensures
that '(q11) < 0 for E(p)  p < p:
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